FIBRAs are built with concrete and capital, but they stand on institutions. That’s why the recent market changes cannot be understood solely as corporate moves or portfolio adjustments.

Between 2024 and 2025, FIBRA Prologis’s majority acquisition of FIBRA Terrafina and the creation of FIBRA Next from the spin-off of FIBRA Uno’s portfolio reshaped the sector and reignited the debate on concentration and market power. In Mexico, however, the reading is not linear. The question is not only who concentrates assets, but what institutional framework makes it possible—or not—for that concentration to become effective economic power.

As Dr. Edmar Ariel Lezama Rodríguez, professor and researcher at UNAM’s School of Economics and member of the National Network for Business Productivity, Innovation, and Competitiveness (REPICE), explains, the visible concentration in the FIBRA market reflects less a logic of dominance than the ecosystem’s own scale.

“Unlike the United States, where the size of the FIBRA market allows a broad distribution of players and assets, Mexico’s market is smaller and the number of vehicles and participants remains limited. Under those conditions, any concentration metric naturally tends to show higher values. That does not imply closure or competitive distortion, but rather a market in its early stages of development. The concentration observed is, therefore, a statistical result of scale, not a sign of dominant power.”

Even that reading, however, requires nuance. Mexico’s FIBRA market does not operate as a homogeneous system, but as a set of regional markets with different speeds and depths. The greatest maturity is concentrated along the northern border, Greater Mexico City, and the Bajío, as well as in certain cities in the southeast where supply chains are consolidated, logistics infrastructure is in place, and foreign investment is sustained. In the rest of the country, dynamics differ and competition plays out at smaller scales. Speaking of “concentration” in the aggregate can therefore be misleading: not all markets compete under the same conditions or from the same base of development.

In this context, competitive risk comes less from the scale of the players than from the institutional conditions that frame the market. The entry and expansion of new participants depend on legal certainty in resolving disputes, on the outcome of the upcoming USMCA review, and on territorial stability in regions where insecurity still shapes day-to-day operations. When these factors remain in transition, part of the potential capital stays on the sidelines. Competition, then, is not limited to assets or portfolios, but to the State’s ability to guarantee stable rules that allow the market to unfold fully.

Legal stability, however, depends not only on the rulebook: it also depends on symmetry of access to information.

Dr. Lezama explains that “in Mexico’s case, the risk lies less in market concentration than in unequal access to public information relevant to investment decisions. When actors—public or private—receive advance notice of future infrastructure or urban development projects, they can position themselves ahead of the rest of the market. That information asymmetry alters the terms of competition by affecting the ability to value or acquire assets promptly. The core issue is not the size of the players, but the—intentional or unintentional—leakage of strategic information.”